




A puzzle arises when combining two individually plausible, yet jointly
incompatible, norms of inquiry. On the one hand, it seems that one shouldn’t
inquire into a question while believing an answer to that question. But, on
the other hand, it seems rational to inquire into a question while believ-
ing its answer, if one is seeking confirmation. Millson (2021), who has re-
cently identified this puzzle, suggests a possible solution, though he notes
that it comes with significant costs. I offer an alternative solution, which
doesn’t involve these costs. The best way to resolve the puzzle is to re-
ject the prohibition on inquiring into a question while believing an answer
to it. Resolving the puzzle in this way makes salient two fruitful areas in
the epistemology of inquiry which merit further investigation. The first
concerns the nature of the inquiring attitudes and the second concerns the
aim(s) of inquiry.
1 Introduction
Carmen is curious about whether she has enough eggs to make a frittata. She
remembers seeing eggs in the fridge, and believes that they’re still there, but
decides to check again to make sure. Kai is splitting a dinner bill with a friend.
She calculates her share plus the tip and before ponying up the cash, she re-
checks her math. Wyatt is wondering whether he can substitute coconut oil for
butter in a cake recipe. A post on his favourite vegan blog says that he can. The
blog has a pretty good track record, but he calls up his brother, a pastry chef, to
confirm. Carmen, Kai, and Wyatt are all inquirers. They each have some ques-
tion that they’re investigating, and they’re not passively waiting around for ev-
idence to come their way, but are actively taking matters into their own hands.
Here’s another thing that they have in common: each is seeking to confirm an
answer to a question. Carmen is double-checking, Kai is re-calculating, and
Wyatt is getting a second opinion. Moreover, this appears to be on the whole a
good thing; responsible epistemic agents often seek out additional confirming
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evidence, and in some cases it may even be dogmatic or narrow-minded to do
otherwise.1
Millson (2021) has identified a puzzle that arises when considering two in-
dividually plausible, yet jointly incompatible norms of inquiry. On the one
hand, it seems permissible to engage in inquiry to confirm one’s answer to
the question of whether p, while believing that p. However, some, including
Friedman (2019a,b) and Kelp (2020, 2021), have argued that one should not in-
quire into a question while also believing an answer to the question. Following
Friedman (2020), let’s call norms of inquiry ‘zetetic’ norms.2 These two zetetic
norms can be formulated more precisely as follows:
DON’T BELIEVE AND INQUIRE (DBI): One ought not believe a complete
answer to a question, Q, at t and inquire into Q at t.3
INQUIRE TO CONFIRM BELIEF (ICB): One may seek to confirm that p at t
and believe that p at t (Millson (2021): 687).
DBI and ICB are wide-scope synchronic norms that concern the normative re-
lationship between inquiry and belief, and which assume the possibility of in-
quiring while believing.
DBI prohibits what ICB permits, so something’s got to give. But, what?
In what follows, I argue that we should give up on DBI, but along the way I
also argue that the tension between DBI and cases of rationally inquiring into
a question while believing an answer to the question runs much deeper than
is suggested by Millson’s puzzle. This is because one can rationally inquire
into the question of whether p while not just believing that p, but also knowing
that p. The best way out of the puzzle is to reject DBI. Resolving the puzzle in
this way makes salient at least two fruitful areas in the epistemology of inquiry
which merit further investigation. The first concerns the nature of the inquiring
attitudes, and the second concerns the aim(s) of inquiry.
1See Friedman (2019a) for a detailed discussion of re-checking forms of inquiry.
2Cf. Friedman (2020): fn. 1. The Greek term ‘zetetic’ (zētētikos) meaning roughly ‘to proceed by
inquiry or investigation’. Are zetetic norms epistemic norms? And what kind of rationality is at
issue in this debate? I only wish to claim that the relevant sense of rationality is zetetic rationality.
And I don’t take a stand on whether zetetic norms are epistemic norms or practical norms. While
this is an important topic worthy of further attention, it is beyond the scope of the paper. For
further discussion see, for example, Friedman (2020, Forth), Thorstad (2021), and Steglich-Petersen
(Forth).
3This norm is defended by Friedman (2019a,b) and Kelp (2020, 2021). Friedman (2017): 311 also
defends an Ignorance Norm: “Necessarily, if one knows the answer to a question, Q, at t, then
one ought not have an IA [i.e. an interrogative or inquiring attitude] towards Q at t.” Also, see
Whitcomb (2017) who defends the view that an Ignorance Norm constitutively governs the speech
act of asking a question, as well as Sapir and van Elswyk (Forth) who use data from hedging in




A detective in a play, who merely pretends to be curious about who the mur-
derer is, is not engaged in genuine inquiry. Why not? What’s the difference
between a detective who is genuinely inquiring and a mere actor whose be-
haviour is seemingly identical? A difference one might cite is in their respec-
tive states of mind. The inquiring detective is really curious or is wondering
about who the murderer is—the actor isn’t. Friedman (2019a,b) argues that in
order inquire into some question one must have an inquiring state of mind di-
rected towards the question.4 According to this view, inquiring attitudes are
interrogative states of mind that have questions as their contents and they are
directed towards questions that one wants to figure out the answers to. Fol-
lowing this line of thought, let’s assume then, for the time being, that interrog-
ative attitudes are a necessary component of genuine inquiry. (I will call this
assumption into question in Section 5.)
How do interrogative attitudes cohere with other doxastic attitudes such as
belief? One way of developing an answer to this question draws upon data
from conversation and considers the felicity conditions of utterances that are
used during the course of inquiry. Consider the following:
(1) # I believe Frida is a painter, but I wonder whether Frida paints.
(2) # I know Frida paints, but I’m curious: is Frida a painter?
Why are (1) and (2) infelicitous? These utterances represent the speaker as
having an inquiring attitude (i.e., wonder, curiosity) towards some question
while also believing an answer to that question. This, however, is precisely
the mix of doxastic attitudes that DBI prohibits. DBI can thus explain why
utterances like (1) and (2) are infelicitous because they represent speakers as
having a rationally incoherent state of mind; as settled and unsettled upon the
answer to a question.
In tension with DBI, Millson offers evidence in support of ICB. He draws
upon a range of linguistic data, especially the felicity conditions of biased in-
terrogatives as they are used in confirmation requests. Consider the following
(Millson; 2021, 687-690):5
(3) Gold is an element, isn’t it? [tag-interrogative]
(4) Isn’t gold an element? [negative polar interrogative]
(3) and (4) represent the speaker as having some affirmative non-neutral atti-
tude towards the truth of a possible answer.
4Also see Friedman (Forth, 2020, 2017, 2013a,b), as well as Whitcomb (2010) and Carruthers
(2018) for related discussion.
5There is a rich literature on the semantics and pragmatics of biased questions. For further
discussions see, for example: AnderBois (2019); Farkas and Roelofsen (2017); Gunlogson (2001,
2008); Malamud and Stephenson (2015); Asher and Reese (2005) and van Rooij and Ŝafár̂ová (2003)
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How do biased questions support a zetetic norm like ICB? Millson consid-
ers the possibility that biased questions, and hence, the inquiries which under-
lie them, are consistent with categorical belief in the question’s answer. If this
is right, then, contra DBI, it can be rationally permissible to both inquire into a
question while believing an answer to that question.
Thus, a puzzle for the zetetic norms arises from the incompatibility of DBI’s
prohibition on believing that p while inquiring into the question of whether p, and
ICB’s permission to believe that p while inquiring into whether p.
3 A Solution?
Millson considers, though does not explicitly endorse, the following solution
to this puzzle. He suggests that the data from biased interrogatives might not
express the speaker’s belief, but rather their credence. Specifically, if we assume
a view according to which one can have a maximally high credence in p, yet fail
to believe that p, then we can perhaps explain the data from biased interrog-
atives without having to abandon DBI.6 Accordingly, the linguistic data from
biased questions doesn’t support the rational compatibility of inquiry and be-
lief. Instead, it supports the rational compatibility of inquiring into a question
while having a high degree of confidence or credence in the answer. But, and
this is the crucial part, this is consistent with failing to believe that p, and so is
also consistent with a norm like DBI.
It’s noteworthy that this way of resolving the puzzle comes at a cost: it
requires that one reject a Lockean view of belief on which to believe that p is
to have a credence above a certain threshold in p.7 Millson notes that this is a
serious dialectical burden and he is skeptical that this solution to the puzzle is
worth the cost (Millson; 2021, 691).
However, there is an alternative solution which can remain neutral on the
relationship between credence and belief. This solution rejects DBI on the
grounds that one can inquire into a question while not only having a signif-
icantly high credence in p, but also while knowing, and hence, outright believ-
ing that p. Thus, regardless of whether or not one is an anti-Lockean about
belief, there is yet a further, even stronger, reason to reject DBI in favor of ICB.
4 Knowing While Inquiring
Consider the following case adapted from Brown (2008).
(8) Fatima, an expert surgeon, is scheduled to preform an operation this afternoon.
She has spent the morning carefully studying the patient’s file, and knows that
6For a defence of such views, see for example, Buchak (2014); Friedman (2013b); Staffel (2016)
and Jackson (2019).
7Lockean views of belief are defended by, for example, Goldman (1979); Foley (1992); Swin-
burne (2001); Sturgeon (2008) and Marvin (2019). For an overview of this debate see Jackson (2020).
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it’s the left kidney which needs to be removed. A few hours later, before the
surgery, she thinks to herself :
“Okay, now I know it’s the left kidney, but I’m going to double-check
the patient’s file one last time—just to be sure. After all, imagine how
horrible it would be if I removed the wrong kidney.”
(8) is a perfectly coherent, natural, and even praiseworthy thought. However,
notice that Fatima already knows that it’s the left kidney, yet she decides to
inquire further into this matter. To strengthen this point, we can imagine the
following series of events unfolding.
(9) Fatima walks into an nearby office where her resident is studying the patient’s
file. He’s a reliable informant and she trusts his judgment. She asks him the
following.
(b) Can you please confirm: is it the left kidney or is it the right kidney?8
The resident responds.
(c) It’s the left kidney.
Another resident overhears this interaction and asks a nearby nurse the following
question.
(d) Why did Fatima just ask her resident about which kidney it is? Didn’t
she already know which kidney it was?
The nurse responds.
(e) Of course she knew! She’s only investigating further to be abso-
lutely certain. Wouldn’t you want your doctor to double-check which
kidney it was before they operated on you?
This case casts doubt upon DBI given that Fatima is inquiring into a question
while not just believing, but also knowing an answer to it.
One might object and claim that Fatima no longer believes or no longer
knows that it’s the left kidney when she opens her inquiry. For example, Fried-
man (2019a) defends the view that an inquirer no longer retains their knowl-
edge or belief that p when they re-check the answer to whether p. She describes
double-checkers like Fatima as shifting from a state of belief to a state of sus-
pended judgment on the question (2019a, 88-89).
Does Fatima no longer know that it’s the left kidney when she double-
checks the patient’s file? This seems highly unlikely, given that she’s an expert
8Notice that this is an alternative question not a biased question. In this case the speaker offers
her interlocutor a pointed choice between two closed options (the left or the right kidney). In
asking the question in this way the speaker does not indicate her own stance on the matter (unlike
the case of biased interrogatives), for in some cases this may influence the respondent’s answer,
potentially weakening their ability to confirm the answer. For an analysis of alternative questions
see, for example, AnderBois (2011, 2019) and Biezma and Rawlins (2015).
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surgeon and that she had carefully studied the patient’s file just a few hours
earlier. We can assume that her memory on this issue is fairly fresh, and that
in the meantime she has not encountered any defeating evidence or reason to
think otherwise. So, she is plausibly interpreted as maintaining her knowledge
when she seeks confirmation before the surgery.9
How does this case connect to Millson’s puzzle? If it is rationally permissi-
ble to inquire into a question while knowing the answer to the question, then,
a fortiori, a zetetic norm like ICB is also plausible. This is based upon the as-
sumption that if you can engage in inquiry while knowing the answer, then
you can surely engage in inquiry while having a weaker epistemic state, such
as belief or credence.
The solution that Millson considers as possibly reconciling DBI and ICB
does not account for inquiries like Fatima’s; that is, it does not explain how it
can sometimes be rational to inquire into a question while having knowledge of
its answer. Views about the nature of belief and credence are largely orthogonal
to resolving this deeper tension between DBI and cases of rationally inquiring
while knowing.
5 Future Implications
The rationality of inquiring into a question while knowing its answer suggests
a number of fruitful areas for future investigation into the epistemology of in-
quiry. Here I outline two such areas.
5.1 The Inquiring Attitudes
If it can be rationally permissible, in at least some cases, to inquire while know-
ing, then what might this imply for the relationship between inquiry and in-
terrogative attitudes? Earlier (in Section 2) I granted the assumption that inter-
rogative attitudes, such as curiosity and wonder, were a necessary component
of inquiry. From there, we had motivated DBI by considering which doxas-
tic states were rationally compatible with interrogative attitudes, and hence,
with inquiry. However, cases of rationally inquiring while knowing call this
assumption into question.
Certainly, in many cases it is correct to describe inquirers as curious or as
wondering about the answer to some question. As Millson (2021) has pointed
out, this is also true in cases of inquiries which involve biased questions. He
9For further defence of this point see the arguments given in Brown (2008): 176-177. One might
argue that, due to the high stakes involved in this case, Fatima fails to maintain her knowledge
while inquiring. More generally, one might defend the view that if the stakes are high enough to
motivate the need for further inquiry, then they also undermine one’s knowledge. A principle like
this is needed to rule out cases of rationally inquiring while knowing. However, it’s unclear why
we should accept such a strong principle. This principle can’t be assumed, and it requires motiva-
tion and further argument, especially given how natural it is to describe Fatima as knowing in this
case. For further support for the view that agents in cases like Fatima’s retain their knowledge see,
for example, Reed (2010); Gerken (2011, 2017); Locke (2014, 2015) and Jackson (2019).
6
offers compelling evidence which suggests that in uttering a biased interrog-
ative, and hence in seeking confirmation, speakers typically express interrog-
ative attitudes. This helps to explain why it’s often infelicitous to combine
biased interrogatives with an overt denial of an interrogative attitude.
(10) # I’m not wondering whether gold is an element, but (gold is an element,)
isn’t it? (Millson; 2021, 688)
However, it’s unclear that this will hold universally across all cases of in-
quiry. Specifically, in some cases of inquiring while knowing, it appears that
interrogative attitudes may not have any necessary role. If one already knows
that p, it seems rationally permissible, in at least some cases, for one to lack an
attitude of curiosity or wonder concerning the answer to the question.
Consider again Fatima, the expert surgeon. She need not be wondering
or curious about whether it’s the left kidney. In fact, it’s rather straining to
interpret her as having one of these interrogative attitudes, given that she’s a
medical expert and that she already knows that it’s the left kidney. Nonethe-
less, her lacking this attitude is perfectly consistent with her having a desire to
confirm that it’s the left kidney or a desire to be sure that or to be certain that it is.
More generally, the desire to be certain or sure that p need not entail that one
has an interrogative attitude directed towards the question of whether p. If this
is right, then it suggests the possibility of rational inquiry without interrogative
inquiring attitudes.
One way to approach this observation is to contend that the inquiring at-
titudes exhibit more diversity than, to my knowledge, has previously been
recognized. In addition to interrogative inquiring attitudes (e.g., wonder or
curiosity concerning whether p), there may also be propositional inquiring at-
titudes (e.g., the desire to confirm that p or to be sure that p) which may guide
one’s inquiry. These two species of inquiring attitudes may not be mutually
exclusive—perhaps one may have an attitude of curiosity directed towards the
question of whether p, while also desiring to confirm that p. However, in other
cases, one might just have the desire to confirm that p or, just have an attitude of
curiosity directed towards the question of whether p. These issues are complex
and require further reflection and argument. I solely hope to sketch the outline
of an alternative way forward in understanding the inquiring attitudes.
5.2 The Aim(s) of Inquiry
The plausibility of rationally inquiring while knowing also sheds new light on
debates surrounding the aim(s) of inquiry. A popular view is that the aim of
inquiry is knowledge.10 However, cases like Fatima’s suggest that the aim of
inquiry is not (or not only) knowledge. If one has already achieved the aim
10For defence of this view see, for example, Hannon (2019); Kappel (2010); Kelp (2011, 2014,
2020, 2021); Kvanvig (2009); Millar (2011); Rysiew (2012); Whitcomb (2010, 2017) and Sapir and van
Elswyk (Forth). This view is also strongly suggested across the work of Friedman, see especially
Friedman (2017): 309-311 and fn. 14, Friedman (2013a): 145, and Friedman (2019b): 299. See Archer
(2018) for an insightful criticism of this view.
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of inquiry—if one already knows that p—then why inquire any further? If
knowledge is the goal of inquiry, then inquiring after one knows (especially
if one is is aware of their knowledge) seems superfluous or potentially even
irrational. But, Fatima’s inquiry doesn’t appear to be superfluous, nor does it
seem irrational.
Cases of rationally inquiring while knowing thus help to uncover the value
of inquiry in attaining epistemic states other than knowledge or justified belief.
Fatima doesn’t aim to gain knowledge from her inquiry, she’s already got that.
What she’s striving towards is something more—she wants be sure or certain
that p.
Such cases thus draw our attention to forms of epistemic improvement,
other than coming to know the answer to a question, that inquirers might have
the goal of attaining. This may include epistemic states such as certainty or
being free from doubt concerning the answer to a question. However, to be
clear, this is not to say that all inquiries are aimed at certainty. Rather, the
suggestion is that inquiry may not be confined to just one single aim or unified
goal (e.g., knowing the answer to a question), but may involve a diverse range
of epistemic aims, all of which take the form of a general kind of epistemic
improvement. These may include, but are not limited to: gaining a justified
belief, a more accurate credence, knowledge, certainty, or an epistemic state
where one’s knowledge is over-determined by the evidence such that if one
were to lose some of their evidence, one could still maintain their knowledge.11
6 Conclusion
Millson identifies a puzzle arising from the incompatibility of two plausible
zetetic norms: Don’t Believe and Inquire (DBI) and Inquire to Confirm Belief (ICB).
I’ve argued that this tension runs much deeper than Millson has suggested.
Inquiry into a question is compatible not only with belief in the question’s an-
swer, but also knowledge of it. In light of this, the best way to resolve the puz-
zle is to reject DBI. It can be rationally permissible to inquire into a question
while outright believing, or even knowing, its answer. Reflecting upon such
cases, makes salient at least two fruitful areas which merit further attention in
the epistemology of inquiry. The first concerns the nature of the inquiring at-
titudes, which might be more diverse than one might have initially thought.
And the second concerns the aim(s) of inquiry, which may involve more than
just coming to know the answer to a question.12
Brown University, United States, arianna_falbo@brown.edu
11I develop and defend the view that inquiry aims at epistemic improvement, and that the in-
quiring attitudes come in both propositional and interrogative forms, in Falbo (ms.).
12Thank you to Scott AnderBois, Zach Barnett, Bob Beddor, Endre Begby, Thomas Brandt, Ying
Huang, Haigen Messerian, Elizabeth Miller, Jared Millson, Joshua Schechter, Julia Jael Smith,
David Thorstad, Anna Tsvetkov, Peter van Elswyk, Dennis Whitcomb, Elise Woodard, and two
anonymous reviewers from Analysis for comments which greatly helped to improve the paper.
Special thanks to David Christensen.
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